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Abstract 
 
This paper explores both the politics behind and the policy impacts of the design of 
EU regulatory institutions.  The EU has established an extensive ‘Eurocracy’ outside 
of the Commission hierarchy, including over two dozen European agencies and a 
number of networks of national regulatory authorities (NRAs).Building on research 
on the politics of EU level agencies and regulatory networks, the paper will first 
attempt to explain the politics of institutional choice: why do EU policy-makers create 
agencies in some policy-areas, while opting for looser regulatory networks in 
others. Second, the paper will assess the impact of these institutional choices: can EU 
regulatory networks deliver the cooperation and harmonization of regulatory practices 
that their advocates promise? Introduction 
The Eurocracy is growing.  It is growing, however, not in the ways its opponents had 
feared nor in the ways its champions had hoped. Euroskeptics who depict the 
European Commission as a burgeoning bureaucracy are misguided, as the 
Commission remains a remarkably small executive with approximately 25,000 
employees.  Widespread political opposition to the creation of anything 
approximating a large, unified executive bureaucracy in Brussels has long-since 
ended hopes, for the few who harboured them, of creating a European superstate.  
Nevertheless, the Eurocracy has grown and continues to grow in novel ways.  
European policy-makers have constructed regulatory structures necessary to govern 
the European market, but, to paraphrase Marx, they have not done so in circumstances 
of their own choosing, but under existing circumstances transmitted from the past. 
In constructing the Eurocracy, policy-makers have had to contend with and integrate 
existing national regulatory bodies.  Also, policy-makers have had to address political 
conflicts between member state governments and EU institutions (such as the 
Commission and Parliament) concerning the design of EU regulatory structures.  
Some conflicts have focused on fundamental questions of the balance of power 
between national governments, the Commission, and Parliament, while others have 
focused on distributional conflicts concerning the economic implications of various 
regulatory arrangements. 
Ultimately, this ‘politics of eurocracy’ (Kelemen 2005) has led to the establishment of 
a diverse set of regulatory structures at the EU level, including over thirty EU 
agencies and a number of regulatory networks
1.  Collectively, the number of officials, 
both European and national, engaged in policy making in these agencies and networks 
far surpasses the number of employees of the European Commission.  The emergence 
of the Eurocracy has not gone unnoticed by academic analysts.  A number of scholars 
have examined the establishment of EU agencies (Kreher 1997; Kelemen 1997, 2002, 
2005; Majone 1997; Shapiro 1997, Gehring and Krapohl 2004, Krapohl 2007; 
Groenleer 2006, Feick 2006) while others have focused on the emergence of pan-
European regulatory networks (Eberlein and Grande 2005; Eberlein and Kerwer 2004, 
Joerges and Neyer ; Tarrant).  Meanwhile other scholars have examined the politics of 
delegation in the EU more generally, examining conditions under which member 
states delegate to the Commission or national administrations (Pollack 2004, 
Franchino 2006). For all their theoretical and empirical strengths, these studies tend to 
focus on particular aspects of the Eurocracy (such as agencies, networks or 
comitology), and thus do not provide a comprehensive view that considers the full 
                                                 
1 Estimating the number of regulatory networks is difficult, as estimates would vary considerably 
depending on what was included in the category. There are regulatory networks which have officially 
been constituted as networks which advise the Commission (for example, the European Regulators 
Group in telecoms), there are other regulatory networks which have not been officially recognised but 
which the Commission has helped initiate, for example an informal network of rail regulators engaged 
in access regulation, and there are regulatory networks which act independently of the Commission. 
More than one type of network may exist in the same sector. For example in both energy and telecoms, 
there is an independent grouping of regulators which exists alongside the body constituted by the 
Commission. The difference in practice between the recognised and the independent body is that when 
the regulators wish to discuss an issue without the Commission present that they nominate themselves 
the independent grouping; otherwise, the same individuals are involved. Further research is being 
undertaken to try and identify the number of regulatory networks.    range of choices available to decision makers and explains the reasons for and impact 
of their design choices.
2 
This paper seeks to contribute to such a comprehensive explanation the politics of 
Eurocracy.  First, we explore the politics behind the institutional choices in the design 
of EU regulatory bodies.  Above all, we seek to explain why in some policy areas, 
policy-makers have opted to create EU level agencies, while in other areas policy-
makers have established much looser regulatory networks.  Second, we explore the 
consequences of institutional choice.  Designers of EU regulatory bodies and 
scholarly observers have promised many things, including regulatory independence, 
exchanges of best practices, consensus building through networks and promoting 
harmonization through soft-law without resort to inflexible centralized regulation.  
But have the new agencies and networks delivered?  Have some institutional 
arrangements delivered better than others?  Is regulation based on a network model 
feasible?  Or will the limitations of networks potentially lead to the formation of more 
supranational authorities? What relationships are emerging between national 
regulators and supranationals? 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  In section I, we briefly review 
existing literature on EU regulatory bodies and present our central arguments 
concerning the politics behind EU regulatory institutions.  We offer an explanation of 
why policy-makers opt for centralized authorities in some cases and looser regulatory 
networks in others, and present our hypotheses concerning the likely impact of these 
institutional choices.  In section II, we explore the politics of EU regulatory networks. 
In section III, we examine the politics of EU agencies.  Finally, in section IV we 
conclude. 
I.  Argument 
 
When a decision is made to regulate a sector at EU-level, decision-makers face a large 
range of options in terms of the bodies that can be tasked to deliver the regulation. 
The following possibilities, all of which policy-makers have discussed as options for  
appropriate regulatory bodies in the EU Telecommunications Framework, illustrate 
the wide range of options policy makers face in designing regulatory institutions: 1) 
whether the Commission, an alternative sui generis European-level agency, or sector 
specific NRAs should be vested with the power to regulate, 2) whether supervisory 
powers over the national regulators should be given to the Commission, Ministries or 
alternatively to a collective body of the NRAs, 3) the degree to which the actions of 
either the Commission or the NRAs should be  independent of review from the 
devolving national legislative/executive actors
.3 In other words, EU policy makers can 
delegate to the Commission, to EU agencies or to networks of NRAs.  Moreover, they 
can delegate to these bodies with varying systems of control and degrees of discretion.  
How then do EU decision makers decide which form of Eurocracy to rely on?   
 
It is not possible to understand the nature of European agencies or networks of 
regulators without understanding the wider domestic and European institutional 
                                                 
2 For an exception see Coen and Doyle 2000. 
3 See the Section on the politics of networks below  system within which they are designed and embedded. Each sectoral institutional 
ecology is shaped by the preferences of the relevant political actors, mediated by the 
rules of decision-making in the relevant sectors. 
 
The relevant decision-makers in any particular policy field will vary depending on 
whether the regulatory institution is created as a result of treaty amendment, in which 
case only the European Council has formal power, or whether the regulatory 
institutions are created under powers already contained in the Treaty. In either event, 
representatives of the Member States, if they are in agreement on the regulatory 
structure, are likely to be the dominant negotiating partner. In the field of internal 
market legislation where much of the EU’s regulatory activities are concentrated, the 
decision-making bodies are generally the Council and the Parliament, with the 
Commission enjoying a quasi-legislative power due to its power of initiative.
4 
Legally, if the Council wants to set up a body which makes regulatory decisions 
outside of the Commission, then in accordance with the current jurisprudence of the 
ECJ, it must make a Treaty amendment to create a sui generis body
5. This was done, 
for instance, in order to create the European Central Bank and Europol. On the other 
hand, an agency which advises the Commission need not have a basis in the Treaties, 
but can simply be created by an act of secondary legislation.  However, in that event, 
the agency only has collective power to the extent that its advice is accepted by the 
Commission, although it may be politically difficult for the Commission to ignore the 
collective advice of the agency executive (particularly if the Commission’s decision, 
is itself subject to ministerial comitology, as it is in pharamaceuticals). Finally, 
networks of national regulators, independent of an agency arrangement need not be 
created through EU legislative or constitutional processes at all. Rather, they can be 
created by the NRAs themselves and possibly formalised later by Commission 
decisions appointing them collectively as advisor to the Commission when exercising 
its powers.    
 
                                                 
4 
(It should be noted that if these bodies did not legislate that the default regulator could become DG Competition; the 
Commission could therefore potentially attempt to make unilateral decisions to regulate a sector. The latter, sometimes backed by 
the ECJ, set out to pursue this as an objective for the utility sectors in the mid-1990s. Indeed, this was one of the incentives for 
the Council to agree re-regulation which returned control of these sectors to NRAs (Nihoul and Rodford: 37; Tarrant  (2004): 14-
17 ). 
 
5 
Agencies can be set up by secondary legislation but sui generis independent regulators like the ECB require a Treaty 
amendment. This is because independent European regulatory agencies are viewed under the Meroni doctrine as in principle 
being unconstitutional since they disturb the “institutional balance” of the Treaty by potentially moving European-level executive 
powers away from the Commission which should otherwise be the European executive body. In Meroni (1957) the Court held 
that Community law did not allow delegations of discretionary powers to bodies that were not created by the Treaty. It allowed 
that executive powers could be delegated as long as they were circumscribed and the delegating body remained the decision-
maker. The Commission’s formal view on regulators is set out in its European Governance White Paper of 2001 which states that 
“Agencies cannot be granted  decision-making power in areas in which they would have to arbitrate between conflicting public 
interests, exercise political discretion or carry out complex economic assignments.” (European Commission, 2001: p.24) 
However, a body that actually acted as an independent  regulator at European level would have to engage in precisely these tasks. 
Legally, this could then only be admissible by making such a regulator another sui generis European institution through a Treaty 
amendment. 
 
 In designing EU regulatory institutions, Member States are typically confronted with 
a tension between their desire to make credible regulatory commitments and their 
desire to manipulate the distributional consequences of regulatory decisions.  The 
former concern would tend to encourage member states to opt for more centralized 
(i.e. EU level) and independent regulatory bodies, while the latter concern calls on 
member states to maintain as much national control as possible.  Certainly, concern 
with the need to make credible commitments has overridden distributional concerns in 
some instances, as for instance in the 1990s, when Member States enshrined the 
operational independence of the ECB and central banks so as to commit to stable, 
neutral policy (Ziloli and Selmayr: 627).
6  However, in the design of most 
‘Eurocratic’ institutions, outcomes are significantly influenced by Member State 
concerns over the distributional effects of regulation. 
  Unsurprisingly, where Member States believe that a particular institutional 
outcome is likely to have unfavourable distributional consequences from their 
perspective, they are likely to veto it.
7 Member State governments have often chosen 
to exercise their negotiating power in order to ensure that they remain the principals 
of NRAs. Indeed, a substantial attraction for Member States of the oft-hyped model of 
EU Framework regulatory directives policed purely by national regulators is that this 
institutional arrangement allows Member States to preserve their autonomy as to the 
actual content of regulation applied within their jurisdiction and thus the distributional 
outcomes.
8  More generally, we argue that the greater the distributional conflict in a 
policy area, the less likely member states are to delegate regulatory authority to 
autonomous European level regulatory bodies, and the more likely they are to opt 
delegate to bodies (such as networks of NRAs) more subject to control by national 
governments.
9 
 
The Parliament’s preferences with regard to ‘eurocratic’ structures have been driven 
by two primary concerns.  First, the Parliament has sought to protect its institutional 
self-interests.  Along with the growth of its legislative power, the European 
Parliament has sought to assert itself as a watchdog of the EU executive bodies (such 
as EU agencies or networks) that implement EU directives. To this end the Parliament 
has demanded greater transparency and judicial oversight of regulatory processes.
10  
                                                 
6 It should be noted that when the Commission or the European Parliament suggested importing that 
wording for sector-specific regulators, they were rebuffed. 
7 This behaviour is not just a feature of protectionist Member States. To give an example, the UK in 
1995-98 was hostile to the concept of the Euroregulator for telecoms. This was a Member State which 
had liberalised early and whose incumbent was aggressively acquiring overseas assets and was 
expected to benefit from pro-competitive regulation elsewhere. The UK’s concern was primarily based 
on the fear that any centralized institution would be controlled by a majority of Member States that 
were perceived as not being genuinely interested in pursuing pro-competitive policies. Policies that 
were set centrally could then fetter the ability of the UK NRA to pursue pro-competitive policies. 
8 In this context, it is worth noting that the NRA’s that participate in pan-European networks in many 
sectors are far from being ‘independent’ agencies.  Most NRA in broadcasting, electricity, gas, posts, 
rail,  telecoms are not independent of the government. Most are resourced directly by the government, 
staffed by national civil servants, the heads are usually appointed by the Minister and they are 
potentially subject to legislative override. In some countries the Ministry has “sleeping” overlapping 
powers. Sometimes the NRA is actually situated within the ministry; for instance, 12 of the 27 Rail 
NRAs are simply departments within their state’s transport ministry. 
9 This hypothesis parallels Franchino’s (2005, 2006) arguments about member state decisions to 
delegate to the Commission or to member state administrations. 
10 Where the primary regulatory actor is the NRA, as it is in the context of the networks, the Parliament 
has successfully insisted on appeal being available to a national court on the merits of regulatory 
decisions not just on procedural aspects.  This overturned existing practice in a minority of Member Second, the Parliament has sought to maximize its popularity with voters, by 
favouring regulatory institutions that promise to yield favourable outcomes for 
consumers.  These preferences have not led the Parliament to favour the same 
bureaucratic structures in all policy areas.  Rather, in sectors already subject to 
significant privatization and liberalization, such as electricity, gas and telecoms, the 
Parliament has been in favour of supranational decision-making (more strongly in 
telecoms) and in favour of national regulators being made more clearly independent 
of national ministries.
11 In more sheltered sectors such as posts and rail, it has been 
silent on this: but equally, there has not been a strong push by new entrants for an EU 
access regime in these sectors and post and rail privatisation is often not a popular 
political position. The perceptions of the consequences of rail privatisation in the UK 
have also severely damaged MEPs confidence in the benefits of competition in that 
sector.
12 
 
The European Commission has demonstrated a clear, enduring hierarchy of 
preferences concerning the structure of regulatory bodies.  Unsurprisingly, the 
Commission has generally preferred supranational over intergovernmental solutions.  
Generally, the Commission’s first preference would be to expand its own regulatory 
capacity and authority, through increased financing, staffing and grants of regulatory 
powers.  However, since the late 1980s, it has become clear that Member State 
governments are unwilling to countenance any significant expansion of the European 
Commission.  It was when the Commission was faced with increasing regulatory 
burdens in the run up to the 1992 target for completion of the Single Market and was 
unable to win political support for expanding its own capacities that the Commission 
turned to promoting the establishment of EU level, ‘independent’ agencies and 
transnational regulatory networks.  European level authorities with considerable 
autonomy from national regulatory authorities are the Commission’s clear second 
choice, while the Commission has ended up promoting networks only where more 
centralized solutions have not received support. 
 
Generally, the Commission and Parliament share an abiding preference for more 
supranational (as opposed to nationally controlled) regulatory institutions.  Therefore, 
the greater the influence of the Commission and Parliament  in the politics of 
bureaucratic design in a particular sector, the more likely that a supranational 
regulator (either the Commission itself or an EU agency) will be tasked with 
delivering regulation.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
States where either appeal was restricted to traditional judicial review (ie principally fairness of 
procedures) or appeal was restricted to an administrative unit within the sponsoring Ministry. In both 
energy and telecoms, the Parliament has required periodic legislative reviews which give it the 
opportunity to reassess the application of existing legislation and for the interim periods incorporated a 
requirement in the legislation for the Commission to report on progress.   
11 European Parliament (2000: 9). The rapporteur’s comment on the amendments at first reading on the 
draft ONP Framework Directive: “…in your rapporteur’s opinion, only a genuine European regulatory 
authority is in a position to make completely sure that a genuine European market develops which 
functions, after the fashion of the planned networks, seamlessly in the interests of all citizens. For that 
reason, your rapporteur believes it is necessary that the value which Parliament attaches to the 
establishment, ultimately at least, of such an authority be restated.”
 European Parliament (1996). 
 
12 Interview [add full reference]. The Commission’s evolving position on a European regulatory architecture for 
telecoms well illustrates its hierarchy of preferences. In telecoms, the Commission has 
successively pushed for regulatory content to be set by: 1) the Commissions own DG 
Competition, 2) a Euroregulator, 3) individual NRAs subject to a Commission 
administrative veto, and now what it is calling “European Regulators Group +” or 
“ERG+”
13.  In the first instance the Commission offered to surrender all its powers to 
the ERG if it would take up a majority decision making basis for regulatory 
obligations. Subsequent to its refusal to do so, the Commission is now referring to a 
model where it makes the formal decision subject to the collective advice of the ERG 
(interviews). In this variation, ERG+ would look to have similar characteristics to a 
European Agency (whether or not it is formally described as such).The Commission 
is proposing the same model for gas and electricity
14. 
 
Bureaucratic agencies, once created, can become powerful, self-serving actors in their 
own right (Moe 1989).  In the EU context, it is particularly important to consider the 
impact of networks of NRAs.  Once created, NRAs may become relevant actors in the 
debates over the allocation of powers, and they generally seek to maximize their own 
authority, either by resisting delegation to supranational bodies or by seeking to 
repatriate authority that had already been delegated to supranational authorities.  The 
extent to which they engage in substantive supranational activity appears to be a 
reflection of the extent to which the Commission has been attributed powers of 
implementation and thus indirectly (and probably directly in many cases) of Member 
State preferences. In the areas of utility access regulation where the Commission has 
no sector-specific powers at all there is either very little discussion of access issues in 
a network of regulators (e.g. rail) or none at all (eg posts).
15  
Conversely, where the Commission’s powers have increased over time, the 
networks of regulators have become more active.
16 The threat of an increase in 
powers also seems to have some effect; it is noticeable that in response to the threat of 
the Commission requesting the ability to veto NRA regulatory obligations in telecoms 
that the ERG/IRG has acted to give the impression of more cohesive activity.
17 In gas 
and electricity, once the Commission was granted the ability to set compensation 
payments for cross-border electricity flows and to set binding guidelines on access 
charging in 2003, the national regulators began to construct the mechanisms that 
would allow them to discuss  the content of access regulation (including the detail of 
payments and charging mechanisms).
18 In 2007, there will be new draft regulatory 
legislation in electricity, gas, posts and telecoms. The combined electricity and gas 
                                                 
13 The “plus” would mean that the ERG 
took up formal decision-making competences and exercised them. 
14  Commission communication “Prospects for the internal gas and electricity markets” COM(2006) 841 of 10.1.2007, p.12-13. 
15 Interviews (add full cites). 
16 This might suggest that the Commission should be extremely careful about seeking a “neutralisation” of the Meroni doctrine 
which some legal experts have recommended (Geradin and Petit: 31-36). Networks of regulators may only function in the 
“shadow” of a potential Commission veto.   
17 “Conscious that it had not necessarily been fulfilling its potential as a mechanism for regulatory approximation and the 
promotion of the internal market, the ERG has invested a considerable amount of its resources during the past year to improve its 
own effectiveness as an organisation”. ERG Letter of 27 February 2007 to Commissioner Reding, p.5. In fact, what the ERG has 
agreed internally in terms of rule change at plenaries in 2007 and which are described in the letter as a response to the 
Commission’s proposals ie common positions formed by consensus but subject to two thirds majority decision-making where no 
consensus, was in fact a restatement of the existing position.   
18 ERGEG, press releases on gas and electricity regional initiatives, PR O6-06 and 06-05. regulatory network (ERGEG) has responded quite differently to that of the telecoms 
regulatory network, ERG, in the sense of asking for the ability to set detailed 
regulatory conditions at supranational level
19, whereas the ERG refused the latter
20. 
However, their responses are similar in that they have both asked to take over 
competences that have already been granted at European level to the Commission. 
(ERG was content to request taking over only the current Commission veto on the 
triggering conditions for the application of regulation)
21.   
 
Finally, our expectations regarding the effects of the choice of eurocratic structures 
follow closely from our foregoing discussion of the preferences of key actors.  As 
mentioned above, the effect of a choice for a network of NRAs as opposed to some 
centralized Euroregulator (the Commission/ a sui generis European entity/ an agency) 
is that reliance on NRAs leaves each Member State free to pursue different economic 
outcomes. The consequences are sometimes argued to be theoretically beneficial in 
allowing learning effects. However, where the freedom is used for protectionist 
purposes, networks are also likely to prevent businesses achieving pan-European 
economies of scale and scope. They may also potentially create unfair trading 
conditions whereby laxly regulated entities in one Member State can acquire more 
heavily regulated actual or potential competitors in other Member States. 
 
II.  Politics of European networks   
A stand alone network of regulators is unlikely to be very successful in promoting 
effective regulation when it is underlying disagreement over the content of regulation 
which leads to its adoption as the primary mechanism for joint policy-making. The 
first section below examines theoretical claims made for networks of regulators in the 
utility field as a mechanism for effective coordinated regulation. The second part of 
this section will examine the role, powers and effect of the European Regulators’ 
Group (“ERG”) in telecommunications. It provides evidence that the ERG has had 
little effect to date on regulatory practice and consequent market outcomes. It cannot 
do so because its members are not in fact genuinely independent of ministries.  To the 
extent to which the body provides substantive collective advice to the Commission, 
there is not a great deal that the Commission can do with it, as its powers under the 
regulatory framework are also highly circumscribed.  
 
The choice between a European agency and a regulatory network is typically, in its 
pure form, a choice between, on the one hand, an institution which combines majority 
decisions subject to a Commission veto and, on the other hand, an institution which 
features neither of these mechanisms.  
 
When we compare differing institutional outcomes in energy, pharmaceuticals, posts, 
rail and telecoms, variation in the number of Member States owning regulated entities 
seems to be a plausible explanation for different institutional outcomes between the 
sectors.   The starting point at the moment of liberalization of each of the utility 
                                                 
19 ERGEG’s reponse to the European Commission’s Communication “An Energy Policy for Europe). Ref. CO6-BM-09-05, 6 
February, 2007,pp11-16. 
20 Ibid, p.6. 
21 Ibid, p.4. sectors was identical. In each, a vertically integrated state owned operator owned a 
monopoly delivery infrastructure and was in general the monopoly provider of 
services provided over that infrastructure. Creating competition in each of these 
sectors required not just that new entrants were allowed to enter the market but they 
had non-discriminatory access to the  monopoly delivery infrastructure (Pelkmans: 
439-440, Cave and Valletti, 332). This requirement for non-discriminatory access 
created the need for a regulator. While most Member States were in favour of new 
private investment, they were also concerned at the economic and political risks of 
exposing incumbents to competition. An effective regulator could increase risk. The 
economic value of the state shareholdings was a significant state asset and realisable 
if full or partial privatisation was envisaged. Annual profits were also a sizeable 
contribution to state income. The incumbents tended also to be the largest corporate 
employers in any Member State, and their workforces were highly unionized and 
often civil servants. 
  
With respect to electricity, gas, posts, rail and telecoms, where there has been an 
increase in powers of the Commission, it has been broadly parallel to a reduction in 
the degree of state ownership in each of the relevant sectors.  Posts and rail remain 
almost completely dominated by integrated nationalised companies in the EU; the 
relevant EU Directives for posts does not deal with access issues
22 and that for rail 
accords all responsibilities to NRAs
23. In telecoms, the Commission obtained no 
powers of implementation in 1998 at a time when there was greater than 25% state 
ownership in 13 out of 15 Member States (OECD 1998). In 2002, the Commission 
was given limited centralized powers at a point when ownership greater than 25% had 
been reduced to 8 Member States (OECD 2002). State ownership is of course a crude 
proxy for concern over distributional issues.  A Member State might privatise and 
nonetheless have a preference for preserving a national champion. Equally, Member 
States with a state owned company may alter policy. For example, since the election 
of a centre-right coalition in Sweden, the new government has begun considering a 
reform of the regulatory regime to remedy a situation where the NRA’s attempt to 
implement the telecommunications regime was crippled by the appeals system.
24  
                                                 
22 European Parliament and Council (2002c) 
 
23 European Parliament and Council (2001) 
 
24  The White Paper is available at  
The english summary is on pages 27-41 
http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/07/12/95/f8427277.pdf 
  
 Table 1 (Sources for ownership figures; ECORYS (2004,2005), OECD  (2002), EPSU, Beltratti et al)  
 
 
Sector   Number of 
vertically 
integrated 
incumbents with 
state 
ownership>25% 
Access regulators 
formally 
independent of 
ministries 
Access rules in 
Framework 
Directive 
Commission 
implementation 
powers with 
respect to access 
European Agency 
dealing with 
access issues 
Independent 
Network that 
discusses 
regulatory access 
issues 
Independent 
network that 
discusses 
regulatory access 
issues in detail 
Independent 
network in favour 
of binding 
majority decision 
making at EU 
level 
Posts 26  23  (usually  same 
as telecoms 
regulator. 
However access is 
only regulated in 
Germany and in 
the UK) 
Does not require, 
does not prevent 
No No No   No  No 
Rail 24  15  Yes No  No  (but  Agency 
set up for safety 
issues) 
Barely No  No 
Telecoms 12  26  Yes  No  (but  powers  of 
veto as to 
triggering factors 
for application of 
regulation) 
No Yes  No No 
Electricity  9    Yes Some  No   Yes Yes Yes 
Gas 4    Yes Some  No  Yes Yes Yes   
Pharmaceuticals   ? but limited, 
under 8% of value 
of sector in EU  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
  
Network Governance Theory 
 
An alternative view is that regulatory networks will give rise to informal cooperation 
between national regulators to meet the functional need for effective European-level 
regulation which would otherwise be frustrated by the resistance of Member States to 
devolve regulatory powers to a supranational institution. Effectiveness here is defined 
as “the capacity to produce (including to make other actors produce) collectively 
binding decisions on the supranational level, decisions that fill the regulatory 
gap.”(Eberlein and Grande 2005:156) 
 
This theory is consistent with and derives from other theories which seek to explain  
the “New” Governance of the EU. The latter defined as methods of policy-making 
that depart from the “Community” method of legislating through the use of 
regulations and directives and instead relying on participation at European level of 
national actors in a collective learning process (Eberlein and Kerwer (2004:123)
25.In 
particular, Eberlein and Grande’s work draws on application of the theory of 
“deliberative supranationalism”. This is in essence a constructivist approach which 
had been applied to the work of committees in the European Union. In committees, it 
is argued that a culture develops of  “…interadministrative partnership which relies on 
persuasion, argument and discursive processes rather than on command, control and 
strategic interaction” (Joerges and Neyer: 620). The outcomes of the decisions made 
in the committees, it is argued, are neither intergovernmental nor supranational.  They 
are not intergovernmental, because the participants are socialized into pursuing 
collective decision-making within the parameters of  the formal objectives devolved 
to the Committee under the legislation, pursuit of  which gives a primacy to objective 
scientific evidence.  Nor are they supranational, because the Commission is obliged to 
recognize that it cannot pursue objectives which will not meet with at least a qualified 
majority of supporters (Ibid: 618).  The solution to this apparent dichotomy is that the 
participants to the committees pursue the scientific-rational logic of the committee, 
overcoming the interests of the institutions which they represent. The suggested 
principal  mechanisms of this divorce are: (i) participation means that delegates have 
an informational advantage over their domestic administrations which allows them to 
shape national preferences (Ibid: 620); and (ii)  participation means the development 
of common converging definitions of problems and philosophies for their solution 
(Ibid:620)
26.  
 
The unwillingness of Member States to grant regulatory powers to supranational 
authorities where there are distributional issues at stake means that regulatory powers 
are granted to national regulators instead.  However, this gives rise to a 
decentralization problem as national regulators could defect from the spirit of EU 
                                                 
The classic example of “new governance” is the Open Method of Coordination. For a general 
discussion of OMC see Zeitlin and Pochet (2005) For a critical appraisal see Idema and Kelemen 
(2006)  
26 Or as Joerges and Neyer put it in another article, delegates “….slowly move from representatives of 
the national interest to representatives of a Europeanised interadministrative discourse in which mutual 
learning and understanding of each others difficulties surrounding the implementation of standards 
becomes of central importance.” (Joerges and Neyer 1997: 291).  legislation. There is therefore a functional need for cooperation in order to ensure a 
level-playing field
 (Eberlein and Grande: 99). Regulators therefore come together to 
achieve harmonizing decisions. Defection is prevented by “professionalisation”: 
“…Professionalisation creates a strong, shared frame of reference that facilitates 
convergence and homogenization. National officials are driven by a “reputation 
game” with their national counterparts. They will seek to comply with “best-practice” 
regulatory standards to maintain their good standing in the professional community.” 
(Eberlein and Kerwer: 162) If this is not sufficient constraint, then the transparency of 
regulatory regimes reinforces it. A further pressure for conformity is that regulators 
that are unable to observe the commitment required by professionalisation will be 
unable to make credible commitments to its partners and will not therefore be able to 
become effectively involved in transnational networks (Eberlein and Grande: 103). 
 
There are, however, some clear weaknesses to this theory in relation to the regulated 
utility sectors, which are characterised by the existence of monopoly access operators 
often with state ownership. Eberlein and Grande do recognize that if there are 
redistributive conflicts between Member States that this may adversely affect the 
effectiveness of informal harmonization (Ibid:104). However, since this is arguably 
the reason for the creation of national regulators rather than upwards delegation in the 
first place, adverse effects are likely to be built into the system of cooperation from 
the beginning. In other words, the description of a “functional need” in the theory is 
rather one-sided. The functional need from a supranational or a new entrant 
perspective may well be a “level playing field”; it could be quite another from a 
national government’s perspective, where the first best option could be compliance by 
everyone else but not by one’s own regulator
27 or indifference to any cross border 
trading and a political priority to preserve the numbers employed by the domestic 
incumbent.  Furthermore, while professionalisation could have the effects described, 
further analysis of the concept needs to be developed in order to describe what form 
of professionalisation would have the constraining effect described. Most regulatory 
staff are in fact civil servants and their careers depend upon promotion within the 
national civil service structures. The heads of regulatory institutions are political 
appointees and may even be politicians. There is no real market for international 
utility regulators. The number of meetings they attend with their international 
colleagues may also be rather limited. These factors suggest that the primary loyalty 
of regulatory staff must be to their national regimes.  
 
Participants in regulatory networks will not necessarily have an informational 
advantage over domestic colleagues. This is because they are not the only source of 
information about either supranational policy development or the potential effects of 
such policy development on domestic circumstances. Ministries still collectively 
occupy the voting positions on European regulatory comitology bodies. The regulated 
entities usually also collectively employ a full time and well-resourced permanent 
secretariat in Brussels. Many of them also maintain their own individual permanent 
offices in Brussels. They are also the possessors of the greatest amount of information 
                                                 
27 Eberlein provides the following example of beneficial defection: “Take the example of an incumbent 
operator in the electricity business. A lenient domestic regime helps to protect the home market from 
new competitors. Almost unassailable at home, the operator can more easily expand into foreign 
markets that are more open to new entrants. The current expansion of French electricity giant EDF 
from a rather secure home base into other European markets illustrates this point quite 
clearly.”(Eberlein 2003:153) about the impact of regulation on domestic circumstances, since such regulation is 
targetted on them. Consequently, a Ministry at an informational disadvantage to a 
participating regulator has alternative sources of information when required. 
 
Participation in the various European regulatory networks is also by right, it is not as a 
result of making credible commitments. There is no contractual arrangement between 
the different national regulators. To date, the networks at most issue best practice 
statements of principle, not binding decisions. There is no synchronization of national 
regulatory decisions applying the principles adopted in the network, which might 
otherwise be necessary in theory to facilitate retaliation for non-compliance, although 
energy may be moving away from this. Furthermore, there is no effective mechanism 
whereby retaliation could even occur.  Offended regulators could not discriminate 
solely against a company in their area of regulatory jurisdiction on the basis that it 
was owned by the incumbent in the country of the offending regulator. The company 
could easily demonstrate that it was being discriminated against on the basis of 
nationality and this would be a clear breach of EC law for which a court would grant 
interim relief. And in any event, any generalized and surreptitious return to 
protectionism would have the potentially effect of returning all regulators to the 
desired position of the protectionist countries.   
 
A pre-condition for a “reputation” game is clearly that regimes are sufficiently 
transparent for regulators or third parties to judge whether or not they are 
implementing the principles. Eberlein and Grande argue that  “They are very well 
informed about the activities and performance of their regulatory counterparts in other 
jurisdictions. Since they do not wish to be perceived as failing to meet, in their 
domestic arena, the standards of their profession, peer pressure can go some way to 
increase compliance.” (Eberlein and Grande 2005:162) The regulatory regimes tend 
not to be transparent. There is no institution that collects rigorous and comprehensive 
data on the quality of regulation in the utility sectors. For example, OFGEM cannot 
find the data to establish why energy has not flowed over interconnectors connecting 
UK grids to Europe despite enormous price differentials.
28 Complete failures to 
implement can be observed, however weak implementation or skewed 
implementation is extremely difficult to track. Another example is that the single most 
significant form of transparency in a vertically integrated industry is accounting 
separation. In energy, posts rail and telecommunications, none of the relevant 
information is published to third parties, except in two of Member States.
29 
                                                 
28 In the November 2005 cold snap in UK wholesale gas prices increased 400% but the gas 
interconnector only flowed at 50% of capacity. In February 2006, the interconnector flowed at 90% of 
its capacity despite prices being much lower and only slightly above EU levels. OFGEM said it was 
unable to work out the causes since there was inadequate transparency on continental markets. 
(OFGEM 2006:2). 
29 For telecoms, see ECTA Scorecard (2006). In gas and electricity, neither the Commission nor new 
entrants have undertaken any study to investigate the extent to which the accounting separation rules 
allow non-discrimination to be demonstrated. Centrica say that it is not the case (Interview). A 
Commission official said that accounting separation in the energy field had “never really worked” 
(Interview). It should also be noted that in the telecoms directives, peculiarly, that the remedy of 
accounting separation, unlike any of the other remedies, is subject to any conflicting national laws. 
Article 11(2) of the Access and Interconnection Directive states “…National regulatory authorities may 
publish such information as would contribute to an open and competitive market, while respecting 
national and Community rules on commercial confidentiality.” ECORYS found in a report for DG Tren 
in 2006 that 55% of railway undertakings were compliant with the rules on accounting separation in the 
rail directives. However, these rules are extremely general. The report also stressed that “…it should be  
Finally, it may also be the case that the regulators that are part of the regulatory 
networks are not even the bodies in some countries that actually conduct national 
implementation of the best practice papers agreed in the networks. Regulators may 
actually be parts of Ministries or advisors to Ministries which exercise decision-
making powers 
30. And even if NRAs are the decision-making bodies, controls may 
be in place that ensure that where they have those powers that they take account of 
interests other than those of interaction with their international peers.  The collective 
of national energy regulators, ERGEG, itself recognises that one of “critical point 
delaying or hampering the development of more efficient and integrated electricity 
and gas markets in Europe..[ is the]…insufficient independence and/or capacity of 
regulatory authorities.” ERGEG (2004:p.5). 
 
It is also useful to clarify the type of decisions which the networks make. They do not 
make “effective” decisions as defined by Eberlein
31.  Decisions of  IRG/ERG for 
example are guidelines and the less agreement there is among the regulators, the 
vaguer are the guidelines. Furthermore, as discussed below, the participants do not 
appear to consider that decisions of the networks are binding upon them.  
 
The European Regulators Group in Telecoms: a network case study  
 
Background 
 
The ERG is an institution which brings the European Commission and the NRAs 
together. It is not a creation of the Directives regulating the sector, the Council 
collectively having struck out a draft article creating such a body from the Framework 
Directive on the basis that as an actor it would be a potential competitor for the 
comitology body on which ministries sit
32. Rather, it is a body created by a 
Commission Decision permitting a range of national regulatory authorities to “advise 
and assist” the Commission with respect to the latter’s duties under the Directives
33. 
The Commission effectively building on the existing Independent Regulators’ Group, 
which is the same body absent the Commission and which continues to exist in 
parallel to the ERG
34.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
noted that most of the annual accounts do not provide sufficient information to make any 
pronouncement regarding cross subsidies.” (ECORYS: p.30) 
30 A rather clumsy example occurred in Spain in 2006. Until 2006 it transpired, the Spanish Energy 
Regulator only had the ability to advise the Ministry, which took all the concrete decisions. When EON 
(the German energy company) proposed to purchase Endesa (a Spanish energy incumbent), the 
government passed an emergency law to give the Spanish regulator the power to block mergers in the 
sector which threaten a “strategic interest” (EU Business Energy a national issue, not European: 
Spanish Minister). This was a little too blatant and the decision was in practice overturned by the 
Commission taking jurisdiction under the merger rules.  
31 See page [  ] above. 
32 Presidency (2001) 
33 Article 3 (Commission 2002) 
34 IRG was set up in 1997.  The ERG has no powers to make decisions which are binding on its members
35. 
Assuming it could make substantive collective positions, it might be considered  to 
potentially have the power to do so indirectly via “advice” which it provided to the 
Commission and upon which the Commission then acted. (There is no formal 
mechanism through which the Commission is required to respond to a collective view 
of the ERG). However, such an indirect power would be subject to the limitations set 
in the Directives to the Commission’s own powers. In actual practice, the 
Commission’s discretion to set regulatory policy in pursuit of harmonisation is 
severely circumscribed
36. Alternatively, as the NRAs are the bodies which are those 
required formally to make the regulatory policy decisions at national level under the 
EU Framework, it has been argued that it could act as a venue for harmonisation 
through coordination and mutual education (Eberlein and Grande). It is the case that 
the national regulators participate in 7 working groups organised under the auspices of 
IRG/ERG and they produce best practice papers. However, given the consensual 
decision-making practices, these are typically drafted in a very general way and 
members do not regard them as morally binding.  
 
Choices of European-level institutions 
 
Member States have had three main occasions so far on which to adopt varieties of 
supranational institutions to set telecommunications regulatory policy and a fourth is 
about to occur. On each occasion, they have attempted to ensure that the maximum 
room for discretion is retained at national level.  Some authors have suggested that the 
disputes over institutions were derived from general constitutional power struggles 
and have been divorced from the content of the regulatory policy itself (Thatcher 
2001:559 , Franchino: 222, Levi-Faur: 189). They have either based this assessment 
on an understanding that the content of regulatory policy was agreed and contained in 
the Directives.  However, the regulatory objectives and principles contained in the 
Directives are general and ambiguous. In so far as the European framework is 
concerned, implementation of these principles and objective has been reserved to the 
discretion of  the NRAs and the nature of the institutions selected and the rules which 
surround them has limited the extent of the Commission’s involvement. This has been 
a function of pursuing a European policy for harmonisation which requires support 
from Member States which wish to promote competition and others which are more 
concerned to support their national incumbent operator. As a consequence, pro 
competitive Member States do not wish to risk override from Member States which 
are anti-competition. Protectionist Member States are concerned to avoid the opposite. 
Opaqueness of the regulatory regimes means that Member States are unlikely to be 
sure where the preferences of many of their peers fall with respect to such a cleavage 
One Member State identifies the Member State preferences as broadly: pro-
competitive: 5; anti-competition: 9; unknown: 13 (interview). The lack of knowledge 
of Ministries would appear to be shared by NRAs. An NRA that is active in the ERG 
                                                 
35 Article 4.1 ERG (2003), although Article 4.2. states that on an exceptional basis decisions can be 
made on a two-thirds basis. Article 4.4. states that the positions or opinions of the Group shall not be 
binding on its members, but that members shall take the utmost account of such positions or opinions. 
At Madeira in 2006, the ERG removed the description of majority voting as exceptional but the non-
binding nature of decisions was preserved (interview). 
36 The Commission has the ability to make comments under Article 7 (3) of  the Framework Directive 
(Commission 2002).  It has the ability to propose a harmonisation measure to a regulatory committee 
comprised of representatives of national Ministries (Article 19), but only with respect to numbering; 
not the most significant of issues. No harmonisation measures have been adopted. was willing in 2006 to characterise 14 of its peers as generally in favour of 
competition (although noted that some appeared to be subject to ministerial pressures) 
but was unable to identify the general stance of 11 and identified 2 as probably hostile 
to competition (interview). Rather than being distinct from policy concerns, 
constitutional struggles have been a surrogate for how those principles and objectives 
would be deployed; operationalisation would depend on who actually directed 
regulatory policy.   
 
The first attempt to regulate the key access and interconnection issues which 
determine whether liberalisation would be a de facto reality as opposed to a de jure 
exercise, was mounted by DG Competition in 1996 through a Commission own-
initiative Directive
37. Member States could have permitted DG Competition to 
become the regulator of access. Instead, they chose to adopt a Council (and by 
necessity Parliament) Directive which would in practice subsume DG Competition’s 
efforts ( Nihoul and Rodford: 37,  interviews)
38 . The second occasion, therefore 
comprises the set of directives adopted in 1997/8, and in particular the Framework 
and Access and Interconnection Directives
39.  
 
The outcome of the second occasion was: a rejection of a Euroregulator
40, no 
substantive Commission implementation powers in the field of access whatsoever
41, 
discretion vested in national regulators, but national regulators which are defined in 
such a way as to ensure that they were not independent of ministries ( and indeed, 
                                                 
37 See Articles 4(a)-(d) (Commission 1996) 
38 According to current and former senior DG Competition officials, the Council (as opposed to 
individual Member States) collectively threatened recourse to the ECJ against the Full Competition 
Directive if the Commission did not initiate sector-specific legislation which would create a 
Framework where NRAs would be the principal regulatory actors 
39 Commission (1997) (1998) 
40 Although never formally proposed due to the unanimous objection of the Member States, it was 
something which Commissioner Bangemann favoured (Bartle, Financial Times 20/10/1997). A study 
to assess support was undertaken on behalf of the Commission by NERA in 1995. The hostility of 
Member States can be seen in the reaction of the Council to a proposed Parliamentary amendment to 
the Interconnection Directive on the subject. This amendment merely called for the Commision to 
review the need for a Euroregulator when the Directives came for review. The Council Working Group 
refused to accept this by unanimity. See Common position 34/96 of 18 June 1996 OJ C 220/13 at 33 
and Common Position 7/97 of 9 December 1996 OJ C 41/48 of 1997 at 63. The press release 
announcing the results of the conciliation committee on Directive 97/33 (PRES/97/84 (20 march 1997)) 
indicates that the Council abandoned this objection, presumably because it was of symbolic rather than 
substantive value: the Commission could in any event include any elements in its review. 
41 The only implementation powers it was given in the Interconnection Directive were to make 
modifications to annexes IV,V and  VII relating to accounting systems and interconnection charges 
(Commission 1997). The drafting of these Annexes excludes the Directives from any binding effect on 
the NRAs; the original Commision drafting made the content of these annexes mandatory. Annex IV 
which deals with cost accounting systems contains a list which “indicates, by way of example, some 
elements which may be included in such accounting systems” , Annex V is a “list of examples of 
elements for interconnection charges”, Annex VII contains the Framework for the negotiation of 
interconnection agreements, Part 1 sets out “Areas where the national regulatory authority may set ex 
ante conditions” and Part 2 contains “other issues the coverage of which is to be encouraged”. Even 
though non binding , amending these lists was subject to comitology and a regulatory committee as the 
form of committee (the Commission originally proposed an advisory committee only.) In most areas of 
legislation, where the Commission is given implementing powers, its not subjected to committee 
oversight and in almost half the remaining cases it is subject to an advisory committee only (Tseblis 
and Garrett: 309).   could be part of ministries)
42, very general principles
43 and a confusion of objectives 
rendering infringement procedures difficult
44.  
 
The outcome of the third occasion for review of law in the sector was a transfer of 
some competencies to the Commission. In exchange for increased discretion for 
NRAs with respect to the imposition of regulation, by the removal of automacity for 
the application of regulation, the Commission was given the power to examine the 
NRA’s market analysis justifying regulation or its removal
45. This was a compromise 
forced on the Council by the European Parliament
46. The European Parliament has so 
far consistently supported more supranational regulation in each review. However, the 
Council was adamant in refusing to give the Commission the ability to review the 
content of regulation decided on by the NRAs.  The Council also refused to 
countenance draft articles for the new Directives which would increase the 
independence of NRAs from Ministries
47 and vetoed the proposition that a committee 
of national regulators advise the Commission on review of NRA decisions
48.  
 
Institutional arrangements in telecommunications are about to be subjected to a fourth 
examination in the context of the 2006 review
49. It is notable in that context that the 
                                                 
42  There is no actual definition of an NRA, rather some requirements which partly defined their 
characteristics. Article 1.5 of 97/51 on independence of NRAs stated: “national regulatory authorities 
shall be legally distinct from and functionally independent of all organsiations providing 
telecommunications networks, equipment or services; Member States that retain ownership or a 
significant degree of control of organisations providing telecommunications networks and/or services 
shall ensure effective structural separation of the regulatory function from activities associated with 
ownership or control.” (European Parliament and Council (1997b)). 
 
43 Some authors consider that the principles in the EU Telecommunications Directive are prescriptive  
(Levi-Faur:189, Schmidt: 245). Levi-Faur, for example, states that the Interconnection Directive 
“determines the principles of the sensitive issue of fixing charges and costs of establishing a uniform 
system for cost calculation.” In fact, the Member States ensured in the Council Working Group that the 
Directives did not contain any constraining principles. While the Directive contains elements that 
NRAs should take into account when dealing with costs, Member States would not agree the relevant 
cost-base, which made the requirement for cost-based wholesale prices meaningless. Leading 
economists in this area,  Cave and Crandall, note with respect to the costing principles “Cost 
orientation  turned out, however, to be an excessively vague phrase, permitting excessive 
interconnection charges…the interconnection directive took a rather catholic view of cost standards, 
citing “fully distributed costs, long run incremental costs (LRIC), marginal costs, stand-alone costs, 
embedded direct costs. Each of these can [also] be measured …on the basis of a historic or forward-
looking basis…” (Cave and Crandall: 50).  
44 Article 1.1(a) of Directive 97/51: “Open network provision conditions shall aim at: - ensuring the 
availability of a minimum set of services, encouraging the provision of harmonised 
telecommunications services to the benefit of users, in particular by identifying and promoting by 
voluntary means harmonised. (Commission) 
45 Article 7 of the Framework Directive 
46 The parliamentary delegation’s preparatory notes for an informal trialogue that occurred during 
conciliation recorded “The Council did not take into account the internal market dimension of the 
regulatory framework and their common position did not provide for a mechanism impeding a NRA to 
take a decision which would endanger the proper functioning of the market.” Notes for informal 
trialogue, Presidency (2001).  
47 The Commission proposed additional text on independence which read “Member States shall ensure 
that national regulatory authorities are able to act freely, without further authorization or control from 
any other agency or body.” Presidency (2001) 
48 Ibid 
49 Article 25 of The Framework adopted in 2002 required such a review. Documentation relating to the 
review can be found at: Commission has privately offered to the ERG to hand over its responsibilities for 
reviewing market definitions and findings of market power to a reconfigured ERG if 
the ERG will support an approach where it reviews the actual content of regulation 
and is reconfigured as a body taking binding majority decisions
50. The ERG 
collectively rejected this approach; agreeing only that they were willing to take over 
the Commission’s powers to review market analysis and significant market power 
findings (ie the triggers for when regulation applies, rather than the content of 
regulation)
51 . This may indicate the constraints provided by their true principals, the 
Ministries, since such proposals by genuinely creating an alternative principal might 
potentially increase NRA decision-making freedom.  
 
The telecommunications regulators have responded quite differently from the 
combined electricity and gas regulatory network (ERGEG). The latter have asked for 
the ability to set detailed regulatory conditions at supranational level for cross-border 
services
52. However, their responses are in fact similar in that they have restricted 
their objectives to take over competences that had already been granted in legislation 
by the Council of Ministers European level to the Commission.   
 
The reasoning for Member States general approach is illustrated by comments from 
two senior national regulators with respect to the opposition of their respective 
Member States to the original Euroregulator concept: 
 
“At the point in time when the issue of the Euroregulator came up, 
we were careening down the path of substantially reducing 
interconnection rates. OFTEL was way ahead of the game. We 
were deeply hostile to anything that might have allowed European 
recalcitrants like France and Germany to jointly determine our 
policy and undermine our good works. In fact, we were not 
convinced that the latter two were really serious about competition 
in telecommunications” (Interview with Donald Cruickshank, 
former Director-General, OFTEL.) 
 
“Portugal would have been opposed unless it was a simple matter 
of coordination or a specific task with which we agreed. We were 
opposed to any federal regulatory body particularly as at the time 
we were seeking a derogation from opening to competition.” 
                                                                                                                                            
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/info_centre/documentation/public_consult/index
_en.htm  
Initial Commission proposals are likely to be published in autumn 2007. 
50 Letter from Commission Reding to ERG of November 2006 entitled “The European 
Communications Network Authority (ECNA) – first outline of the European “FCC”. Under this model, 
the NRAs would continue to make decisions but they would be subject to review by the ECNA.  The 
ECNA would be run by a Council of 12, 9 representing NRAs and 3 members comprising the 
managing board of the ECNA. The members of the managing board could not be employees of NRAs.  
Decisions would be by simple majority. The directives would include new minimum requirements 
regarding the personal, financial and instrumental independence of NRAs. 
51 Letter from ERG to Commissioner Reding of 27 February 2007. According to one off-the-record 
source, a minority of members were in favour of the Commission proposals but agreed to endorse the 
collective position. This minority appears to have been a sub-set of the pro-competition group of NRAs 
identified above. 
52 ERGEG’s reponse to the European Commission’s Communication “An Energy Policy for Europe). 
Ref. CO6-BM-09-05, 6 February, 2007,pp11-16. (Interview with Luis Garcia Pereira, former Head of the 
International Section, Anacom). 
 
Nonetheless, these two regulators institutions were strong supporters of the creation of 
the IRG. Their motivations were partly in order to promote discussion amongst peers. 
However, the motivation of the UK at least, was partly in order to stave off pressure 
for a Euroregulator (interviews). Consistent with this approach, more recently Kip 
Meek, as Director of Policy at OFCOM and then lead official on the 2006 Review, 
has recently argued that ERG need to be seen to promote best practice in order to 
stave off demands for supranational controls over national regulators.
53. The role 
OFCOM envisaged for ERG was an open market coordination-type role, the 
publication of best practice and possibly naming and shaming.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the preferences of new entrants and incumbents have also tended to 
be consistent. New entrants have in general favoured supranational regulation; 
incumbents have favoured national regulation. Previous assessments have sometimes 
found that the “industry” position is confused
54. However, this is because the concept 
of “industry” does not map business interests accurately when the issue is the design 
of regulatory institutions which are by their nature intended to benefit some business 
interests and fetter others. Even when business interests are clearly separated into 
those for and against access regulation, industry views will be ambiguous unless the 
institutions are clearly specified
55. For example, most incumbents were against a 
Commission veto in the 2002 Review, France Telecom’s initial position was in 
favour
56. France Telecom was however in favour, presumably because it calculated 
that such a veto would be subject to ministerial comitology and subject to a regulatory 
procedure (ie ¾ majority votes). The French Ministry’s initial position did not entirely 
make it clear whether or not it accepted a Commission veto, however it was clear that 
any Commission powers needed to be subject to ministerial comitology
57.   In the 
context of the 2006 review, ETNO (the collective incumbents’ association in 
Brussels) believes that there are three possible outcomes to the institutional debate: an 
extended Commission power over remedies, an enhanced ERG/EU regulatory agency 
and the status quo. Its working group on regulatory policy has recommended that 
ETNO promote the status quo as it fears that the other institutional solutions would 
lead to what they consider inappropriate pro-regulatory pressure (interview). ECTA, 
the new entrants association, on the other hand, is arguing for either a Commission 
veto or an ERG+ agency and, in their view, the most likely feasible advance, if there 
is one, formal advice from the ERG combined with a Commission decision. However, 
they would not support any arrangement which subjected Commission decisions to 
ministerial comitology. In their view, the structures they favour would lead to 
pressures for the adoption of what they consider best practice regulation (interview). 
 
Lack of independence of NRAs 
                                                 
53 Meeting between ECTA and Kip Meek of 5
th May 2006. My notes. 
54 See for example, the  NERA report on the Euroregulator.  
55 The NERA report did note “…other respondents stated that they found it difficult to assess the 
possible added value of a European regulator for different regulatory activities without first having 
details of the institutional framework and structure that would support a new ERA.” (NERA) 
56 http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/review99/nrfwd/Frtelec19e.htm 
57 “En tout état de cause, les Etats membres doivent être associés à tout acte produisant des effets 
significatifs, notamment au travers d’une procédure de comitologie appropriée”.See 
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/review99/comments/fradmin28b.htm  
Proving the lack of independence of national regulators is not straightforward.  All 
Member States claim that they have created an independent regulator. For example, in 
interviews conducted by Coen et al, a representative of the German Economics 
Ministry stated that “RegTP [the regulator] was fully independent and claim[ed] that 
there is no political influence on the decision-making of RegTP (Coen, Heritier, and 
Boelhoff 2002:8).  
 
Institutional Design Accounts 
 
Attempts have been made to assess the independence of regulatory authorities by 
assessing the degree of statutory protection from ministerial instruction or influence 
with which these institutions have been endowed. There is an extensive literature on 
the design of independent institutions, although it largely relates to the design of 
central banks. The OECD study of 2000 on “Telecommunications regulations: 
institutional structures and responsibilities”, for example, follows in this tradition and 
states: 
 
 “Whilst the degree of independence is also influenced by 
factors such a political traditions and the personality of the 
head of the regulatory body, the single most significant 
factor is the institutional structure of the regulator. In fact, 
the degree of independence varies from country to country 
according to the institutional arrangements put in place by 
law and regulation.” OECD(2000:14)  
  
However, the OECD report provides no evidence to support this conclusion. It 
engages in no comparative analysis and simply provides a list of the different 
institutional arrangements in different countries and suggests why these arrangements 
would enhance independence. Many of these particular institutional arrangements 
were then adopted by Gilardi and 21 grouped in 5 categories (agency head status, 
management board members’ status, the formal relationship with government and 
parliament, financial and organisational autonomy, and , extent to which regulatory 
competences are shared) and scored in order to provide an index against which agency 
independence could be measured (Gilardi 2002).  However, the risk of this approach, 
as Forder has pointed out with respect to such lists relating to the statutory 
independence of central banks, is that if we concentrate only on the rules contained in 
statutes which are ostensibly there to safeguard regulatory independence, then we end 
up with a measure of the number of controls designed to structure 
independence/dependence but not of actual independence itself (Forder 1996 and 
1997). Forder argues that in the context of central banks that statutory independence 
may not tell us about informal rules and who actually sets policy. He points out that 
detecting these informal rules will be problematic if governments have incentives for 
third parties to believe that there is independence. Furthermore, even if the institution 
is the decision-taker, it may be under the implicit or explicit threat of legislation or 
other sanctions if it does not comply with the government’s wishes.  
 
An attempt has been made to assess the independence of telecommunications 
regulators using the statutory independence approach (Edwards and Waverman 2005). 
Edwards and Waverman score NRAs against 12 institutional elements including whether the NRA is appointed by the legislative or the executive and whether the 
regulator has a fixed term or not. As a consequence of finding the UK amongst the 
least independent on this basis, they admit there is a methodological problem
58, but 
otherwise ignore this difficulty. They also find that the German regulator is the most 
independent, a finding which would have equally surprised most industry observers
59.  
 
 Another model has been suggested by Thatcher for testing independence by 
observing the relationship between politicians and regulators (Thatcher 2004:5). The 
five indicators that he used for testing the use of control by elected politicians over 
regulators were:- 
 
•  party politicization of appointments: the greater the politicization of 
regulators, the lower the likely independence of regulators and the greater the 
control by elected politicians; 
•  departures (dismissals and resignations) of IRA members before the end of 
their term (since it is difficult to distinguish “forced” resignations from 
voluntary ones, they are treated together in the figures); the lower the level of 
early departures, the more likely IRA independence; 
•  the tenure of IRA members: the longer their tenure, the greater their likely 
independence from elected politicians; 
•  the financial and staffing resources of IRAs; 
•  the use of powers to overturn the decisions of IRAs by elected politicians 
 
This seems a superior approach to the simple “statutory” approach, since it has the 
merit of examining some important relationships between elected politicians and 
regulators, which may be dependent on “rules” other than those which are 
incorporated in statute. Thatcher’s conclusion is that on the whole these powers, with 
the exception of limiting IRA’s resources, were not used to control the regulatory 
authorities (including telecommunications authorities) (Ibid:14). However, whether 
this is true of most of the regulators examined in his study which covers all of the 
“independent” national authorities in a range of sectors, not all of these tests have 
been met in the period 1998-2006 with respect to the specific telecommunications 
regulatory authorities. If we take France and Germany for example, we should note 
that in France, until 2004, the Ministry shared regulatory duties with the regulator and 
that in Germany the President of the BNetzA is an active politician
60 . Thatcher, 
however, does note that his findings do not necessarily mean that IRAs are 
independent from elected politicians, rather that if they do control regulators, they do 
so through more informal means which are much more difficult to observe (Ibid:14). 
If we cannot observe the true relationship between the regulator and the elected 
politicians, then we may also need to supplement them with other potential indicators. 
                                                 
58 “Independence is, however, much more than a set of formal institutional rules…It therefore must be 
stressed that the EUR-I index, while capturing independence de jure, does not necessarily capture 
independence de facto. For example, the UK scores only moderately on the EURI-I index, yet most 
industry experts regard the UK as the benchmark in independent telecommunications regulation in the 
EU.” (Ibid:23-24)  
59 The ECTA studies on regulatory effectiveness have consistently found the German regulator to 
among the least effective in the EU. 
60 Mathias Kurth began his political career in 1978 as a deputy in the SPD Fraktion of the Hesse Land 
Parliament and in the legislative period 1994-1999 was parliamentary state secretary to the Hessen 
Minister of Economics. Indeed, if elected politicians care about inward investment or sanctions from the 
Commission, presumably those aspects we can test will likely to indicate that they 
either cannot control the regulator or do not exercise the controls that they do have. 
We may therefore have to examine the effectiveness of national regulatory regimes in 
actually delivering effective regulation and competitive markets. Where NRAs fail to 
do so, and fail to do so over time, it may be reasonable to assume a lack of 
independence. 
 
Qualitative assessment of the independence of BNetzA 
 
This section briefly looks at further evidence with respect to the actual independence 
of an individual NRA and suggests that there is evidence of only nominal 
independence.  BNetzA is an independent authority under the responsibility of the 
German Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour (the “BMwi”). Its President and 
two Vice-Presidents are appointed by the Ministry and are usually shared with two of 
the main parties that are not in government. Regulatory decisions, however, are not 
made by the President but by three member court-like “ruling chambers” which are 
staffed by senior civil servants who report to the President. The position of President 
is non-renewable (Gehring). 
 
In theory as a result of the “court-like” structure of the ruling chambers, German 
regulatory decisions should be independent (Gehring). However, as Doehler notes 
“…these chambers are widely regarded as being free from ministerial instructions. 
But this is only inferred from their court-like image and nowhere guaranteed in the 
law” (Doehler 2003:110). What the law requires is that general instructions have to be 
published in the federal register 
61 and this is meant to ensure the Ministry only makes 
transparent general policy directions rather than interfering in individual pricing 
decisions. However, Doehler notes that “In practice, the overseeing department has 
issued several general and special instructions…if agency delegation was meant to 
offer credible commitment, it went only half way.” (Ibid:110) Doehler does not 
explain a “special instruction”. According to an interview with the Regulatory Affairs 
Director of a German company, the Ministry had interpreted the requirement for 
publication of general instructions to mean that if it issued instructions that were 
specific to an individual set of circumstances then they could be characterised as 
“special” and would not therefore fall under the publication requirement (interview). 
Coen et al noted after an interview with a representative of RegTP that “The RegTP 
complains of constant and subtle ministerial attempts to guide regulatory decision-
making (interview RegTP, February 2000). In sum, while BMwi only rarely formally 
interferes with RegTP decision-making, there seems to be steady informal 
interference. This leaves the Ministry as one of the central players in the regime” 
(Coen, Heritier and Boelhoff: 8).
62 The OECD’s review of regulatory reform in 
                                                 
61 Article 65(5) Telekommunikationsgesetz 1996 
62 A senior German official
  said
 to this author“Structurally the ruling chambers are independent. 
However, President and Vice-Presidents are appointed by the Ministry and they are from the parties. 
Their terms are renewable and there is an expectation about how they will behave – partisan [i.e. 
pursue party interests]…The Ministry could go via the President. He [the President] could then 
summon the Chairman of the relevant ruling chamber. It would be a very subtle process. The President 
has the formal right to give a written order. However, this would never happen as it would show up. 
Instead, the Chairman could be asked to reconsider a particular draft decision. This would be very 
difficult for a civil servant. He could ignore this view, but would want to be very sure of his ground. 
There would be real risks. He could then be moved to another area and this seems to have happened Germany noted “…there have been concerns expressed about the independence of the 
regulator. The government still owns 42.3%
63 of DTAG giving rise to concerns about 
a conflict of its interests as a shareholder and regulatory policy maker.”(OECD 
2004:16) 
 
In the next section, we look at two aspects of implementation necessary for the 
effective application of telecommunications regulation. BNetzA scores poorly with 
respect to accounting separation and is one of the regulators that does not require the 
publication of comparative supply information either solely to the regulator or to third 
parties in general. 
 
The effect of the existence of the IRG and ERG 
 
Establishing the effect of networks is difficult. We can see that they exist and that 
they produce documents of best practice. However, this is not sufficient to tell us the 
extent to which they have an impact. The same difficulties exist as when trying to 
judge implementation of Directives: we need to examine application and outcomes to 
see whether actual implementation as opposed to paper implementation has really 
occurred (Mastenbroek: 1116, Verluis: 13)
64. 
 
This paper selects two aspects of regulation which are supporting remedies to the key 
principle of non-discrimination: accounting separation and transparency requirements. 
They in effect permit control of price and non-price discrimination. They were 
mandatory principles of the 1996 Commission Directive and the 1998 Access and 
Interconnection Directive and became discretionary under the 2002 Directives. An 
NRA that imposes a non-discrimination requirement on an incumbent will not be able 
to verify whether or not non-discrimination is being observed if accounting separation 
and transparency obligations have not also been imposed. 
 
The ERG Common Position of 2003 on Regulatory Remedies describes accounting 
separation and transparency respectively as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
twice. The President can also withdraw the case from the ruling chamber to the President’s Chamber or 
to another Chamber. This has never happened, but the threat alone would act as a discipline
.” 
(Interview) 
63 Another 22% was owned by a state owned bank. The combined ownership is now a total of 38%. 
64 This approach was also adopted by IBM in their analysis of the liberalisation of EU rail markets. 
IBM constructed two indexes: the LEX index and the ACCESS index. Their overall index of 
liberalisation comprised of a joint index with a weighting of 30:70 of these two elements. Their 
justification for this approach was as follows “The LEX Index reflects how adequately the countries 
examined in the study have implemented the regulatory structure, without attempting to comment on 
the actual administrative implementation and the actual effectiveness of the respective legal 
regulations. It is just this which is described in theoretical legal discussions as law in the books. The 
factors examined in the LEX Index, while they are relevant for the market opening, are not of decisive 
character. With reference to the market opening processes of the European rail markets, the formulation 
of national law in a way that is adequate for the market opening is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition.  Decisive for the actual market opening are the factors of the second level, that is the 
ACCESS index.” IBM Business Consulting in conjunction with Professor Dr. Dr. Christian Kirchner  
Rail Liberalisation Index 2004, p.8. IBM also noted that “while the level of the legislative market 
access barriers (LEX Index: law in the books) is gradually converging, the level of practical market 
access obstacles (ACCESS Index: law in action) continues to show significant differences.” Ibid, p.2. “ [accounting separation] is specifically put in place to 
support the obligation of transparency and non-
discrimination…Accounting separation should ensure that 
a vertically integrated company makes transparent its 
wholesale prices and its internal transfer prices…”(ERG 
2003: 49) 
 
“…Transparency is a very important obligation as it is a 
significant counterweight to possible significant market 
power undertakings’ strategies in relation to regulatory 
obligations. Economic literature observes that where access 
is given at particular prices, access requirements can be 
rendered significantly less effective through the use of 
selected standards, quality degradation, late delivery 
etc.”(Ibid:48) 
 
Nonetheless, as with any ERG document, these are described in optional terms. The 
evidence in 2006 suggests that these obligations have hardly been imposed. The 
precise nature of cost accounting systems is not clear in many countries; the outcomes 
of the ECTA Scorecard for 2006 are shown in Table 2.  Of the seventeen Member 
States identified, thirteen were attributed scores of 10 or less out of a maximum of 20.  
The current position appears to be that still only Ireland and the UK have 
implemented in full the Commission’s Recommendations. The view of an accounting 
consultant asked to review the accounting separation regimes of all the Member States 
in 2001 for DG Information Society is that only one or two would then actually have 
been of any use in assessing cases of non-discrimination
65. 
 
The table below indicates that while a headline requirement for Accounting 
Separation has been made in many cases it has not been made operational. A 
negotiator from a major Member State, in the margins of a 1997 Council Working 
Group negotiating the Interconnection Directive when asked by DTI and OFTEL 
representatives why his Member State would support the principle for accounting 
separation but not agree to give the Commission the power to issue binding guidelines 
told them: “We are not ready for anglo-saxon competition. We will agree to the 
requirement for non-discrimination. We will not agree to accounting separation except 
in principle. Consequently, one will not know whether there is non discrimination or 
not…”
66 
 
                                                 
65 Interview with Jean-Luc Gustin. It was also his view that if Member States really wished to introduce  
systems to track non-discrimination, it would take approximately six months and a cost of about £5 
million to take each of the  systems put in place in 1998-9 and make them fit for that purpose; a hardly 
insurmountable hurdle. 
66 Tarrant (2003 :.273).  
Table 2 
ECTA Scorecard on Accounting Separation
67 
Accounting Separation (Art 11 AD) 
Source: ECTA
                                                 
67 ECTA (2006) http://www.ectaportal.com/en/basic651.html 
Section 
Sub-
section  Question  Question  Weight  AT  BE   CZ   DK  FI   FR   DE  EL  HU  IE  IT   NL  PL  PT  ES  SE  UK 
B  2  34 
Does cost accounting 
separation accompany non-
discrimination  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  0  5  5  5  5  2.5  5  5  5  5  5 
      35 
Is cost accounting 
separation methodology 
clearly specified  5  0  0  5  5  0  5  0  0  2.5  5  2.5  5  0  5  5  0  5 
      36 
Are accounting separation 
accounts published  5  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  5  0  2.5  0  0  0  0  5 
      37 
Do separated accounts show 
transfer charging  5  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  5  5  2.5  0  0  0  0  5 
         TOTAL  20  5  5  10  10  5  10  0  5  7.5  20  12.5  12.5  5  10  10  5  20 
      TOTAL 2005    5  0  7.5  0  n/a  2.5  0  5  5  17.5  7.5  0  2.5  5  5  5  20 
Deleted: ¶
Section Break (Next Page) 
 
BT research
68 into the regulatory requirement to publish comparative supply data with 
respect to some key access products for business services in December 2006 in 13 
Member States: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the UK, reveals the following: 
 
Product Publication  of  key 
comparative supply data 
Publication of key 
comparative supply data to 
NRA only 
Traditional PPC  3 Member States   1 Member State 
Ethernet PPC  4 Member States  1 Member State 
ATM Bitstream  3 Member States  1 Member State (a 
different Member State 
from the one above) 
. 
 
Views of NRAs themselves 
 
A questionnaire sent to NRAs in 2005 contained inter alia the following possibilities:  
 
(i)  drafting ERG/IRG pibs and opinions is a consensual practice and it is 
usually possible to find text which covers the positions of all national 
regulators even where they have divergent policy goals;  
 
(ii)  implementing ERG/IRG pibs and opinions is perceived by your institution 
as an obligation;  
 
Six of the twenty five NRAs responded. Four agreed with the first statement, one 
disagreed. One agreed in general but said that if a minority position was held by a 
single NRA only that it might be overruled. All six disagreed with the second 
proposition. Two added the following points: 
 
“If a recommendation/ opinion/common position runs up against a domestic political 
imperative then its useless. It might help where a mere official at the ministry is 
querying the policy of a national regulator and he or she can say that it’s in line with 
the collective view of national regulators. 
 
There is no sanction, social or otherwise, for failure to comply with a 
recommendation/opinion. Everyone recognises that they could find themselves in 
position where they do not wish to apply a pib
69 etc for domestic reasons.    
 
Erg has been mandated to look at the extent to which nras do apply opinions et al. 
However, expect it to be half-hearted. Can’t imagine that the large number of 
countries that do not apply significant parts will agree a methodology that will point 
this out
70.” 
                                                 
68 BT(2007) 
69 An ERG term for  a best practice paper. 
70 In fact, this particular exercise was quietly abandoned (interview).  
 
“IRG pibs are a result of compromise between organisations of very different size, 
mindset and legal background, therefore they are usually very vaguely worded, 
carefully avoiding the critical issues. However, even in cases where the final 
document becomes a truly useful tool for the regulator (ie the ERG Remedies Paper), 
it is not a legally binding document, therefore it is only implemented in light of the 
local market situation.” 
 
A good example of the network of regulators not providing a mechanism for 
overriding domestic constraints can be seen in the regulation of bitstream access in 
Germany. The  ERG produced a paper on the appropriate regulation of bitstream in 
2003
71. One of the leading drafters of the paper was an employee of BNetzA, the 
German regulator
72. BNetzA was also one of the leading drafters of the ERG’s 
remedies paper adopted in 2004
73. Germany was the last country in Europe to begin 
regulating the incumbent’s bitstream product (Cullen), commencing the required 
review in 2006, six years after Deutsche Telekom launched its retail product and three 
years after analysis of the product was required by the European directives of 2003
74. 
Companies that attempted to lodge the IRG/ERG documents during the BNetzA 
national consultation process on bitstream access in 2006 were told that they were 
inadmissible
75. BNetzA resisted making this market analysis for as long as possible 
and when obliged to do so and propose remedies by the Commission, proposed 
remedies that would result in no operational effect. In doing so, it ignored the 
Commission’s comments on what would constitute an effective remedy
76. This 
possibility is built into the institutional arrangements which the Council of Ministers 
agreed when they adopted the 2002 Framework; the original proposals of the 
Commission and the European Parliament would not have permitted this possibility. 
 
 
Quantitative data on outcomes 
 
The points made above could be subject to the criticism that the regulatory framework 
is intended to be flexible to local circumstances and that the full panoply of regulation 
may not be required in every Member State. 
 
The quantitative data is limited. However, that which exists tends to suggest that state 
owned incumbents are allowed to charge higher access prices and that where 
                                                 
71 ERG Bitstream Access. Bitstream access is a wholesale product consisting of the DSL part (access 
level) and backhaul service of the data backhaul network (ATM network and IP network) and is used to 
support data services such as broadband access. 
72 Interviews with participating members of IRG. 
73 Interviews with participating members ERG. 
74 ERG concurs with the obligation – see ERG 2003b:11.  
75 Interview with Felix Mueller, Head of Law and Regulation, BT Germany. 
76 Case  
2007/576http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/library?l=/germany/registeredsnotifications/d
e20070576. Section III of the Comments letter says: "Need for ex-ante price control: The Commission invites 
BNetzA to ensure an efficient ex ante price control. Ex ante price control is of particular importance as otherwise 
excessive pricing may undermine the imposed access. Given the considerable time that has passed so far without 
ATM bitstream access in place, any further delay of the access regulation, for instance, due to the necessity to 
launch dispute settlement if prices cannot be agreed between the parties, should be avoided." BNetzA’s decision 
omits to require ex ante price controls.  regulatory conditions are less stringent that investment in telecommunications is 
lower. The latter would tend to suggest that the access conditions needed to permit 
competition are not in place. 
 
 Evidence presented by Bauer of the difference in regulated interconnection prices 
between Member States in 2000 shows that they vary, depending on the ownership 
status of the incumbent (Bauer 2003:40).  
 
 Public  Mixed  [partly 
privatized] 
Private 
PTOs 
[incumbents] in 
category 
Austria, 
Luxemburg 
Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, 
Greece, 
Netherlands, 
Sweden 
Denmark, 
Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, 
UK 
Interconnection 
(Eurocents)
77 
 
Double Transit 
 
Single  
Transit 
 
Local 
Termination 
 
 
2.53 
(1.63 – 2.58) 
 
1.63 
(1.63-1.69) 
 
1.05 
(1.02-1.69) 
 
 
2.11 
(1.70-2.63) 
 
1.62 
(1.24-1.89) 
 
0.86 
(0.63-1.43) 
 
 
1.92 
(1.54-2.28) 
 
1.22 
(0.90-1.53) 
 
0.76 
(0.62-0.99) 
 
Variations in price do not arise because of major differences in network costs as 
similar technology (provided by a group of four global telecoms suppliers) is used by 
all operators (Edwards and Waverman 2005: 10). 
 
We can also see that the level of investment in telecoms varies and this is likely at 
least in part to be a reaction to the effectiveness of regulation in containing the 
incumbent. For example, investment per capita in telecoms in 2001 was $86 per head 
in Germany and $236 in the UK, a ratio that has been more or less constant since 
liberalisation.
78 In 2004, ECTA conducted a study which assessed regulatory 
effectiveness, defined as a combination of resources available to the regulator (for 
example, sufficient funding), powers to require compliance with its decisions (for 
example, the power to fine), and, outcomes in terms of the availability of a range of 
                                                 
77 These may look like small differences, but these sums are paid per minute of network usage. Cave 
(1997) has noted “ a change of a few percent in interconnection charges can make the difference 
between profit and loss for an entrant, half of whose revenues may at the outset go to the incumbent 
operator.” 
78 OECD (2003). These figures are not broken down to show incumbent and new entrant investment. 
They only give a total. It may seem counter-intuitive but incumbent investment is probably higher 
where new entrant investment is higher.  In the US, the Pheonix Center found that incumbents invest 
more heavily in states where they are more heavily regulated  (Phoenix Center (2003 ). The explanation 
is that this is regulation  designed to promote competitors, and in so far as it is successful, it seems 
plausible that it would force greater incumbent investment for the purposes of creating competition. 
There are certainly individual examples from Europe. BT, for example, in the UK launched a new 
voice over internet product in 2004 but initially only in the areas where the cable companies had 
invested in local access networks.   interconnection products and the comparative price of these products. The ECTA 
study found that there was a wide variation in the regulatory effectiveness of ten 
NRAs, with Germany obtaining the lowest score and the UK the highest. The ECTA 
study found that, after allowing for inflation, there was a 90% correlation between the 
score for regulatory effectiveness and investment levels in Member States (ECTA 
2004:40).     
 
Market Outcomes 
 
There is no readily accessible evidence which describes the relative market power of 
incumbent operators across all markets. However, this could be established by 
examining all the market reviews received by the Commission. There are nonetheless 
indicative graphs published in the Commission’s implementation report. These 
indicate quite a degree of variation in outcomes: for example in fixed voice telephony,  
the Commission’s Twelfth Implementation Report has found market shares for 
incumbents which vary between 44% in one Member State to 99% at the extreme in 
another. (Commission 2007: 21) 
 
 
IV. Politics of European agencies 
European agencies are EU level public authorities with a legal personality and a 
certain degree of organizational and financial autonomy that are created by acts of 
secondary legislation (Commission 2002:3, 1996).  This definition distinguishes 
European agencies from regulatory networks that lack a clear institutional core and 
from other independent bodies established in the Treaties, such as the European 
Central Bank, the European Monetary Institute or Europol. 
  The agencies differ significantly in their structures, functions and resources.  
Broadly, they can be divided into two categories, 1) executive agencies that perform 
managerial tasks on behalf of the Commission and 2) regulatory agencies that provide 
information and advice, make regulatory decisions and coordinate regulatory 
networks.  Twenty-five of these agencies have been or are being established under the 
EU’s first pillar (the EC Treaty).
79  Additionally three agencies have been established 
under the second pillar (concerning Common Foreign and Security Policy) and three 
agencies have been established under the third pillar of the EU (concerning Justice 
and Home Affairs).  Table 3 summarizes existing European agencies and those in 
final stages of the legislative process. 
                                                 
79 Three of these twenty-five agencies are categorized by the Commission as ‘Executive agencies’ as 
opposed to Community agencies.  The ‘executive agencies’ have a more limited remit than the 
Community agencies, as they are established only to implement particular programmes for a fixed time 
period. EUROPEAN UNION AGENCIES 
NAME LOCATION  YEARPRIMARY  FUNCTION 
Cedefop - European Centre for the Development of 
Vocational Training  Thessaloniki 1975Dialogue/information 
Eurofound - European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions  Dublin 1975Dialogue/information 
EEA - European Environment Agency  Copenhagen  1990Information 
ETF - European Training Foundation  Torino  1990Executive 
EMCDDA - The European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction  Lisbon 1993Information 
EMEA - The European Agency for the Evaluation of 
Medicinal Products  London 1993Regulation 
OHIM - Office for Harmonization in the Internal 
Market Alicante  1993Regulation 
EU OSHA - European Agency for Safety and Health 
at Work  Bilbao 1994Dialogue/information 
CPVO - Community Plant Variety Office  Angers  1994Regulation 
CdT - Translation Centre for the Bodies of the 
European Union  Luxembourg 1994Executive 
EUMC - European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia
80  Vienna 1997Information 
EAR – European Agency for Reconstruction  Thessaloniki  2000Executive 
European Police College  Hook (UK)  2000Training 
European Union Institute for Security Studies  Paris  2001Pillar II / Information 
European Union Satellite Centre  Torrejón de Ardoz 2001Pillar II / Information 
EFSA - European Food Safety Authority  Parma  2002
Risk assessment/ 
regulation 
Eurojust - European Body for the Enhancement of 
Judicial Cooperation  The Hague  2002Pillar III / Coordination 
EMSA - European Maritime Safety Agency Lisbon,  Portugal  2002Regulation 
EASA - European Aviation Safety Agency  Cologne, Germany 2002Regulation 
ENISA: European Network and Information Security 
Agency    Heraklion, Greece 2004
Information/ risk 
assessment 
ERA: European Railway Agency    Lille/Valenciennes 2004 Regulation 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control  Stockholm  2004 Information 
European Defense Agency  Brussels  2004Pillar II: Procurement 
Intelligent Energy Executive Agency  Brussels  2004Executive 
Community Fisheries Control Agency  Vigo  2005Regulation 
Executive Agency for the Public Health Program  Luxembourg  2005Executive 
European Chemicals Agency  Helsinki  2007Regulation 
European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders  Warsaw 2004Border  Control 
 
 
                                                 
80 The Council has agreed to extend the mandate of the Centre to become a European Fundamental 
Rights Agency. The Politics of Eurocracy 
European agencies were created first as a political response to a set of functional 
pressures associated with the 1992 single market programme.  Regulatory burdens (in 
terms of data gathering, monitoring, rule-making, licensing) associated with the 
completion of the single market programme demanded an increase in the EU’s 
administrative capacity.  An obvious means by which to meet these regulatory 
demands, and indeed the means favoured initially by the European Commission, 
would have been to expand the Commission’s staff and budget.  However, there was 
strong political opposition across the member states to expansion of the Commission 
bureaucracy.  In this context, the Commission sought novel avenues through which to 
expand the EU's regulatory capacity and turned to the idea of 'independent' European 
agencies.  The ‘independent’ agency model provided an attractive means to strengthen 
European governance structures while circumventing member state opposition to the 
growth of the European Commission.  The notion of delegating tasks to depoliticised, 
‘independent regulatory agencies’ was increasingly popular in domestic politics 
across EU member states in the late 1980s and was therefore likely to appeal to many 
national governments. 
Moreover, from the Commission’s standpoint though delegating tasks to agencies 
outside the Commission hierarchy did entail some sacrifice of bureaucratic ‘turf’, the 
prospect of being able to delegate routine regulatory tasks to agencies and 
concentrating Commission resources on policy making and enforcement was 
attractive in some respects.  And finally, in many cases, the resources and 
responsibilities granted to European agencies were not taken away from the 
Commission as such, but from obscure comitology committees that had long advised 
and overseen the Commission as it implemented EU policies(Dehousse 1997:258). 
  After the success of Commission President’s 1989 proposal for the 
establishment of a European Environment Agency, a wave of agency creation ensued.  
Proposals for a variety of agencies emerged from the Commission bureaucracy, and 
the Commission Secretariat General then stepped in to coordinate the process of 
agency design. (Kelemen 2002:102)  As a series of proposals for the creation of 
European agencies emerged in the early 1990s, the Commission and the Council 
reached a political compromise over how the agencies should be structured and 
governed.  While the precise outcome varied across agencies, all agencies established 
in the early 1990s were subject to the control of management boards composed 
overwhelmingly of member state representatives.  Though the Commission would 
have preferred more ‘supranational’ governance structures, member states in the 
Council demanded that any new agencies be subject to firm ‘intergovernmental’ 
control. In this sense, these supposedly independent agencies were anything but 
independent.  Rather, they were subject to oversight by member state appointees and, 
at least in cases where powers were transferred from the more thoroughly independent 
European Commission to new EU agencies, this arguably reduced the independence 
of EU regulation.  As for the scope of their powers, some agencies were restricted to 
information gathering roles while others were granted limited regulatory powers. 
Finally, the design of the new agencies, based on a hub and spoke network model, 
(Dehousse 1997) served to address member state concerns regarding threats that new 
EU bodies might pose to existing national regulatory authorities:  in the hub and 
spoke structure, a European agency would coordinate and rely on existing national 
authorities, in some cases even delegating tasks to national administrations on a 
rotating basis.  The European agencies could use their position at the hub of these networks to pressure national administrations to conform to common European norms 
and practices, without threatening them with extinction. 
  The European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA),  
which was among the most significant agencies established in the early 1990s, 
typified this structure.  The EMEA was designed to accelerate the slow, fragmented 
and costly process of assessment and authorization of pharmaceutical products and 
thus to facilitate the completion of the internal market in pharmaceuticals. The 
Commission overcame the concerns of national drug testing authorities by proposing 
a network structure that preserved an integral role for these national authorities.  
Essentially, the EMEA would coordinate a regulatory network in which national 
authorities would take turns assessing and authorizing pharmaceuticals for the 
European market. 
Internal variations in the design of the EMEA also reflect member state 
concerns with distributional issues (Feick). The significance of distributional issues 
for Member States is suggested by the variation in the decision-making processes 
adopted with respect to authorisations for pharmaceutical products within the EMEA. 
In the pharmaceutical sector, as a result of pressure to deal with a nominally 
liberalised regime but where individual national licensing schemes were being used to 
block import entry, a reformed EU sector–specific regime was adopted in 1993. A 
mutual recognition procedure (“MRP”) was adopted vis-à-vis existing products. In 
theory, this required national regulators to recognise a product authorised in any other 
Member State, unless they mounted an objection; arbitration could then be conducted 
within the Medicines Agency. A centralised regime was adopted with respect to 
“innovative” products whereby the NRAs had to adopt a formal opinion as to whether 
to authorise, which the Commission would adopt (subject to comitology). 
“Innovative” products were essentially bio-tech products which barely existed in 1995 
so the distributional consequences were very limited. Feick finds that there are very 
few products blocked under the centralised procedure, whereas under the MRP 
companies do not attempt to obtain authorisation for 50% of products in half of the 
Member States in order to avoid objections (Feick: 38-47). In other words, the EMEA 
contained two regulatory mechanisms, and the one that had the most distributional 
consequences was designed to be the least centralized and ultimately proved the least 
effective.  
  In recent years European agencies have evolved from a set of seemingly ad 
hoc institutional experiments to become central elements in the EU’s model of 
governance.  The 2001 White Paper on European Governance (Commission 2001) 
acknowledged the development of European agencies and suggested that the creation 
and greater empowerment of more such agencies could improve EU regulation.  The 
White Paper also called for the establishment of a formal framework for the creation, 
operation and supervision of such agencies.  In a 2002 Communication (Commission 
2002), the Commission proposed a set of guidelines for such a framework, an 
amended version of which was adopted in 2005 (COM (2005) 59 final). 
  The politics of agency design has changed in significant respects in recent 
years.  Conflicts concerning 1) What the agencies should do, and 2) Who should 
control them, remain central.  However, the European Parliament has become an 
increasingly significant player in agency design and oversight.  With the growing 
involvement of the Parliament and heightened profile of existing agencies, questions 
concerning the transparency and accountability of European agencies have become 
more prominent (Kelemen 2005). The Commission, Parliament and Council continue to disagree over the design 
of management boards that oversee the agencies, and a 2003 European Parliament 
Report
81 identified at least ten variants in the structure of boards of existing agencies.  
The Commission continues to push for structures that would insulate the agencies 
from traditional intergovernmental politics, proposing a model in which management 
boards would have 15 members, six appointed by the Commission, six by the council 
and three non-voting members representing stakeholders.  The Parliament in turn has 
expressed a preference for a model in which the Commission would draw up a list of 
candidates to be submitted to the Parliament for scrutiny and to the Council for final 
approval (European Parliament 2003:10). 
More generally, the European Parliament has sought to assert itself as a 
watchdog of the executive, including European agencies, and to enhance the 
transparency and accountability of EU regulatory processes. From the mid-1990s, the 
European Parliament has used its budgetary powers in order to impose accountability 
requirements on European agencies. (Dehousse 1997; Kelemen 2002:105; Flinders 
2004:536). Also, the Parliament has demanded that the agencies adopt formal, 
transparent and judicially enforceable administrative procedures, to enable its interest 
group allies to challenge agency actions and to engage in the sort of ‘fire-alarm’ 
oversight favored by Congress in the US context (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; 
Kelemen 2005).  As European agencies replaced the opaque comitology committees 
that had long underpinned the Commission's regulatory processes, the European 
Parliament demanded that they function with greater transparency and that they be 
accountable to the Parliament and ECJ. 
The transparency and accountability requirements in the founding regulations 
for the recently established European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) illustrate the 
impact of the European Parliament’s heightened influence.  EASA has been given the 
authority to issue airworthiness codes and to issue (or suspend or revoke) individual 
airworthiness and environmental certifications for aircraft products.  The regulation 
(Reg. 1592/2002) establishing the EASA requires the agency to establish ‘transparent 
procedures’ for issuing certification specifications and demands that the agency 
‘consults widely’ with interested parties according to a fixed timetable and that it 
‘make a written response to the consultation process.’ (Art. 43)  Similarly, in taking 
individual decisions on aircraft parts the agency shall ensure that concerned parties be 
granted a hearing and that the agency decision contain the reasons for the decision. 
(Art. 44)  Such ‘Giving Reasons Requirements’ (Shapiro 2002) provide the legal basis 
for interested parties to challenge agency decisions on both substantive and procedural 
grounds.  Similar ‘giving reasons requirements’ have been programmed into the 
founding regulations of other recently established European agencies, such as the 
European Railways Agency, reflecting a general trend toward concern for heightened 
judicial oversight of EU agencies as a result of pressure from the European 
Parliament. 
In short, one can summarize the politics of agency design as follows:  The 
European Commission proposed the establishment of European agencies as a means 
by which to expand the EU’s regulatory capacity, given the Council’s (and to a lesser 
extent the Parliament’s) opposition to expanding the Commission.  Though the 
establishment of European agencies led to a loss of bureaucratic ‘turf’ for the 
Commission in some cases, delegating routine technical duties to agencies allowed 
the Commission to concentrate its resources on its core tasks – policy initiation and 
                                                 
81  policy enforcement.  In its approach to European agencies, the Council of Ministers 
sought to limit both growth and potential ‘drift’ of supranational regulatory bodies 
and to defend the prerogatives of national regulatory bodies.  Also, the Council 
recognized that its existing mechanisms for oversight of EU regulatory processes, the 
notoriously opaque and unaccountable comitology committees, could not withstand 
the democratic deficit critique in the long term.  These preferences led the Council to 
support the creation of European level regulatory agencies subject to the requirements 
that 1) they be controlled by management boards dominated by member state 
representatives, and 2) they be designed along a hub and spoke model that integrated 
national regulatory authorities into their operations.  Finally, after the European 
Parliament became an active player in the politics of agency design in the mid-1990s, 
it has demanded the establishment of bureaucratic structures and administrative 
procedures that enhance the transparency and facilitate ‘fire-alarm’ oversight 
(Kelemen 2002:97; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Pollack 1997). 
 
Turning finally to an assessment of the effectiveness of EU agencies, less 
systematic evidence is available.  In attempting to compare EU agencies with 
European networks of NRAs, it is important to attempt, so far as possible, to compare 
like with like.  In some potentially highly divisive policy areas, such as environmental 
protection or occupational safety, member states only agreed to the establishment of 
European agencies after limiting the remit of these bodies essentially to information 
gathering and dissemination.  Such agencies cannot rightly be treated as ‘regulatory’ 
bodies in a comparative study.  Better candidates for comparison include bodies such 
as the EMEA and the newly created European Aviation Safety Agency and European 
Chemicals Agency.  Of these true European regulatory agencies, only the EMEA has 
been studied extensively. 
The EMEA, particularly when relying on its centralized procedure has proven 
effective and has made significant contributions to the creation of a true single market 
for pharmaceuticals.  Analysts have concluded that the EMEA’s ability to resist 
pressures from parochial interests and its reliance on transparent, legally binding 
decision making procedures, subject to judicial review have been crucial to its success 
(Feick 2006; Gehring and Krapohl 2004).  To better understand the effectiveness of 
EU regulatory agencies, further research, similar to that conducted on the EMEA, 
must be conducted on the operations of other EU agencies. 
 
V. Conclusions  
The institutional architecture of the European Union is changing.  The European 
Commission has become increasingly accountable to the European Parliament and, as 
a result, increasingly politicized.  The days when the European Commission could be 
viewed as akin to an independent agency charged with the completion of the internal 
market (Majone 2002:330) are gone.  Widespread resistance to the growth of the 
Commission’s regulatory bureaucracy coupled with the fact that the  Commission 
increasingly acts as a politically accountable executive, has forced EU decision 
makers to create other regulatory bodies to implement EU policies.  Surveying the 
broad range of areas of EU policy-making, one can observe a wide variety of 
regulatory architectures, from very loose networks of NRAs which lack binding 
regulatory powers to the quite centralized EU agencies empowered to issue EU wide 
regulation. How can we stand the institutional design choices EU leaders make when faced with 
this wide range of options?  Scholars of EU regulation may rightly hope that 
regulatory institutions will be designed to operate with maximal efficacy and to 
produce ‘good governance’.  They should not, however, expect this to be the case.  
The study of the politics of bureaucratic structure (Moe 1989, 1990) suggests that 
bureaucracies are often not designed solely with efficiency and effectiveness in mind.  
Sometimes they are even designed to fail, because actors who have an interest in their 
failure have a hand in their design.  To expect the politics of bureaucratic design to 
yield more optimal outcomes in the EU’s case, would simply be to let hope triumph 
over experience. 
In the EU, concern over the distributional consequences of EU regulation plays a 
significant role in the politics of bureaucratic design.  Where concern over 
distributional consequences was greatest, EU member states have used their central 
position in the politics of bureaucratic design to demand the creation of regulatory 
institutions that allow governments to control the distributional effects of regulation.  
The reliance on networks of NRAs rather than EU-level agencies in many areas of 
sectoral regulation (in particular those with significant state ownership) can be 
understood in this context.  Generally, the politics of bureaucratic design has only led 
to the creation of powerful EU level regulatory authorities in areas where 
distributional conflict was much lower.  
Our analysis suggests that much of the faith placed in the network model of 
governance is misplaced.  Proponents suggests that the EU has come to rely on 
network based governance because it is innovative, exploring new modes of non-
hierarchical governance suited to this 21
st Century multi-level polity.  Our analysis 
suggests that the reliance network based governance is based much more on efforts of 
member state governments to maintain national control over regulation so that they 
can help shelter incumbents and generally favour national interests. Selected Bibliography 
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